Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 6

Date Published: 10-1-2009

Perspectives On The Sources And Eventual Outcome Of The 2008
Economic And Financial Crisis: A Panel Discussion
Stephen T. Evans
Southern Utah University

David Tufte
Southern Utah University

Steven D. Harrop
Robb Kerry
ADB Bank

Joe G. Baker
Southern Utah University

Follow this and additional works at: https://openspaces.unk.edu/mpjbt
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Evans, S. T., Tufte, D., Harrop, S. D., Kerry, R., & Baker, J. G. (2009). Perspectives On The Sources And
Eventual Outcome Of The 2008 Economic And Financial Crisis: A Panel Discussion. Mountain Plains
Journal of Business and Economics, 10(1). Retrieved from https://openspaces.unk.edu/mpjbt/vol10/
iss1/6

This Industry Note is brought to you for free and open access by OpenSPACES@UNK: Scholarship, Preservation,
and Creative Endeavors. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics
by an authorized editor of OpenSPACES@UNK: Scholarship, Preservation, and Creative Endeavors. For more
information, please contact weissell@unk.edu.

64

PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOURCES AND EVENTUAL
OUTCOME OF THE 2008 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
CRISIS: A PANEL DISCUSSION
STEPHEN T. EVANS
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY
DAVID TUFTE
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY
STEVEN D. HARROP
ROBB KERRY
ADB BANK
JOE G. BAKER
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
In October 2008 the Southern Utah University School of Business held a panel
discussion on the current economic crisis. This discussion was part of the School’s
Business Convocation series and was open to the public. The panel was designed with
two components in mind. First, a pair of academics with expertise in financial
institutions and business cycles offered historical and theoretical perspectives on the
crisis. Second, a pair of professionals – a local banking official and a fund manager –
offered perspectives on the current financial situation and practical experience based
on the policy responses to past crises. As moderator, Joe Baker asked each panelist to
make a short presentation on a question of general interest that was related to their
area of expertise; this was followed by an open question and answer session. The
participating panelists and opening questions follow.
1. Stephen Evans, Professor of Finance: Dr. Evans teaches courses on financial
institutions and was asked to provide background of how the crisis occurred and what
the proposed government bailout plan is expected to accomplish.
2. David Tufte, Associate Professor of Economics: Dr. Tufte is a
macroeconomist and was asked to discuss the macroeconomic implications of the
crisis in such areas as inflation, interest rates, economic growth and unemployment.
3. Mr. Robb Kerry, Chief Credit Officer of ADB Bank: Mr. Kerry has an
extensive background in banking as a bank regulator and banker. Mr. Kerry was asked
to discuss the implications of the crisis on banking credit and lending.
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4. Mr. Steve Harrop, Finance Professional in Residence: Mr. Harrop was a
mutual fund manager for several decades before joining the School of Business
faculty where he teaches investments and manages (pro bono) an investment fund.
Mr. Harrop will discuss the implications of the crisis on the stock and bond markets.
I. STEVE EVANS
FINANCE PROFESSOR
As is characteristic of capitalistic societies in general, America seems to have a
proclivity for financial crises, and frequently these critical situations are caused by
unsustainable growth in key industries. Such was the case in the 1890s when the
overbuilding of railroads in the United States led to a severe economic downturn. It
was also the case in the 1920s when speculators in the stock market drove the
price/earnings ratios to levels that averaged over 100 to 1 with some stocks at five
times that amount (see Faulkner, 1960, pg. 644). These unsustainable prices finally
led to the dramatic market collapse that began on October 29, 1929 and which
plunged the nation (and the world) into the Great Depression.
Beginning about the second quarter of 2007 (depending on which economic
indicators are evaluated), a similar “meltdown” emerged with its origins being
primarily in the real estate market. As we near the end of 2008, we find that the
financial crisis has spread to other key industries with banking, securities, and the risk
management industries being notable examples. The crisis has reached such epic
proportions, that the U.S. government is now in the process of implementing
corrective measures including the so-called “bailout program” of approximately $700
billion.
In all of the financial crises of our nation’s history, the federal government has
stepped in to assist with or to provide solutions. For example, the savings and loan
“meltdown” of the 1980s was primarily caused by significantly rising interest rates—
largely a result of the energy crisis of the 1970s. The increased costs of borrowing on
the liability side of the savings and loans’ balance sheets could not be adequately
offset by increasing interest income on the asset side because of the fixed nature of the
long-term mortgages. These institutions (and the millions of depositors whose savings
were affected) had to be bailed out by the 1989 legislation known as FIRREA and
other legislative actions.
The savings and loan crisis have cost American taxpayers tens of billions of
dollars over the two decades that have followed, so by this measure the $700 billion
“bailout” for the current crisis seems “proportional” and reasonable. However, there is
a particular irony in the government’s efforts to implement the “current” bailout
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program, and that is the glaring fact that the government itself has been the primary
cause of the problem. However, before analyzing these causes, it seems appropriate to
highlight a few factors that have been mentioned as possible causes of the current
crisis that have not proven to be primary contributors (see Liebowitz, forthcoming).
First, it might be suspected that unscrupulous lenders have caused the problems
by taking advantage of people who haven’t understood the mortgages they have been
getting into. While there have undoubtedly been many situations of this type, they
have not been the primary cause of the real-estate meltdown. Rising interest rates
might also be considered initially as a factor in the meltdown, but there is not
sufficient evidence to conclude that interest rates have been a significant factor. There
have been other times in our nation’s history when the speed of interest rate increases
has been more dramatic and when the level of interest rates have been higher, but
these have not resulted in mortgage meltdowns.
Also considered a possible cause of the problems has been the use of adjustable
rate mortgages, and certainly statistics show that those who financed with adjustable
rates are a larger proportion of those who have lost their homes than those with fixed
rates, but that has not been the primary cause of the meltdown. Canada and many
other countries have made significant use of adjustable rate mortgages for decades,
but they have not had real estate meltdowns. Lastly, there is a tendency to think of real
estate speculators as the cause of the real estate meltdown and resulting crisis.
Certainly, speculators became a secondary factor, but they were not the primary
cause.
So, what has been the primary cause? The answer lies in the fact that the
government became involved in the real estate industry and mandated that lending
institutions make loans to people who had not previously qualified for loans. The
origins generally go back to the Great Society of the 1960s and the so-called war on
poverty. Government started passing laws that forced private lending institutions to
make loans that they had always considered unprofitable and unsafe. In 1977, for
example, the Federal Government passed the Community Reinvestment Act which
mandated that banks and other lending institutions make loans in poor neighborhoods
and even set up reporting standards to make sure they were complying with the new
laws.
But the real momentum was put in place in the 1990s when the government put
further pressure on lending institutions to make sub-standard loans (referred to as
subprime lending) and equal pressure on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other
mortgage buyers to purchase the loans. Making such loans required banks and
mortgage purchasers to relax the lending standards that had been in place for decades.

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Opinions and Experiences, Volume 10, 2009

67

The government called it “mortgage innovation,” and the term meant that standards
on such things as down payments, income to debt ratios, employment histories, and
formal credit ratings were to be largely abandoned. For example, down payment
standards that had traditionally been 20% to 30% of asset values were frequently
eliminated, and many poor people were able to get into homes with “no money
down”.
With millions of people (who had not previously qualified for home loans)
finally being able to make the purchases, it caused a tremendous increase in the
demand for homes, and the inordinate demand started driving up home prices. As the
upward trend increased, it caught the attention of other speculators in society (both
wealthy and poor), and they also began “jumping on the bandwagon” at increasing
speed. This further increased the demand for homes and the prices of the homes.
Although warnings were given by people both in the housing industry and in
government, the “feeding frenzy” continued unabated, and the result was an
unsustainable increase in prices—what is aptly called a bubble economy. It is an
appropriate term because a bubble always bursts, and an unsustainable level of prices
will also begin tumbling down at some point.
When the housing market started coming apart, especially in 2007, panic set in
and many people started bailing out. With an increasing supply of homes on the
market and a decreasing demand for these homes, values and prices began declining at
an accelerating rate. The financial impact and panic became especially acute among
those who were “upside down.” In financial terms, being “upside down” (or “under
water”) means that a mortgage on a home is greater than the value of the home
because of declining home prices. Those who are wealthy often have a tough time
dealing with it, but those who are poor are especially devastated, and frequently
“wiped out.”
Many homeowners who got into homes they couldn’t afford knew their
circumstances were such that they couldn’t afford the homes in the long run, but they
speculated that the rising home prices would allow them to make a quick profit when
the homes were sold at inflated prices. Now the bubble has burst, and the meltdown
continues. There are a lot of ways of helping poor people but putting them into homes
they cannot afford is not a good way to help, and hundreds of thousands of people are
now losing their homes and/or going bankrupt. For example, a government report
indicated that in October alone, 85,000 homes were lost which was a 25% increase
over October of 2007 (see Clifford, 2008).
The financial and economic damage to the homeowners is only the beginning
of the problem. The damage to the banks and other lending institutions has also been
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catastrophic. A dramatic increase in foreclosures has resulted in a significant loss of
income, a dramatic increase in operating costs, and a resulting drop in the values of
the common stocks of the lending institutions. So, what started as a crisis in the real
estate industry has moved to the lending industry with several large financial
institutions having already gone bankrupt.
But the tenuous situation does not stop there. An additional problem is the fact
that the “bad mortgages” established by the lenders have been “bundled up” in
investment packages and sold by the lending institutions to such mortgage purchasers
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. What they’ve ended up with are massive amounts of
paperwork that are impossible to fully scrutinize, and the effects of the bad mortgages
(mixed in with many that are good) are not fully discovered until there is a downturn
in the market, and then it is too late.
All of these destructive elements were anticipated years ago by many financial
services experts. In the 1990s, as the Federal Government was mandating relaxed
lending standards and increased subprime lending activity, there were many who
warned of the dangers that such government involvement would create. For example,
a 1999 article in The New York Times by Steven A. Holmes stated that “Fannie Mae,
the nation’s biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing
pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and
moderate income people and (has) felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its
phenomenal growth in profits” (see Holmes, 1999).
In a Wikipedia article on Fannie Mae, it states that “In 1999, Fannie Mae came
under pressure from the Clinton administration to expand mortgage loans to low- and
moderate-income borrowers. At the same time, institutions in the primary mortgage
market pressed Fannie Mae to ease credit requirements on the mortgages it was
willing to purchase, enabling them to make loans to subprime borrowers at interest
rates higher than conventional loans”.
The Wikipedia article then quotes a 1999 article from The New York Times
that states “that with the corporation’s move towards the subprime market, ‘Fannie
Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during
flush economic times. But the government-subsidized corporation may run into
trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of
the savings and loan industry in the 1980s.’”
Alex Berenson of The New York Times reported in 2003 that Fannie Mae’s
risk is much larger than is commonly held. … Nassim Taleb wrote in The Black
Swan, “The government-sponsored institution Fannie Mae, when I look at its risk,
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seems to be sitting on a barrel of dynamite, vulnerable to the slightest hiccup.” “And
then Peter Wallison, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said that
“From the perspective of many people, including me, this is another thrift industry
growing up around us. If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them
out the way it stepped up and bailed out the thrift industry.”
Over the years there have been many appeals to Congress to deal with the
potential crisis, but neither the U.S. Senate nor House of Representatives have been
willing to act (see Hume, 2008). For example, in April 2001, the (White House)
appealed to Congress to deal with the situation stating that the potential problems
could “cause strong repercussions in financial markets.” Then, in 2003, the
administration upgraded the problem to “a systemic risk that could spread beyond just
the housing sector.” In further appeals to Congress to push for a new Federal Agency
to supervise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, John Snow, the Treasury Secretary,
appealed to Congress stating that “We need a strong world class regulatory agency to
oversee the prudential operations of the GSEs and the safety and soundness of their
financial activities.”
On February 17, 2005, Alan Greenspan stated that “Enabling these institutions
to increase in size, and they will once the crisis in their judgment passes, we are
placing the total financial system of the future at a substantial risk.” Then on April 6,
2005, Alan Greenspan added that “If we fail to strengthen GSE regulation, we
increase the possibility of insolvency and crisis.”
In a further appeal to Congress on May 25, 2006, Senator John McCain gave a
speech to Congress stating that “For years I have been concerned about the regulatory
structure that governs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the sheer magnitude of these
companies and the role they play in the housing market. The GSEs need to be
reformed without delay.”
In spite of these and many other warnings by industry watchers and
government officials, the excesses and abuses of key industries have continued to run
unabated, and now the economies of the United States and other industrialized
countries are in great peril. As a nation, we have seldom faced challenges of such
magnitude and complexity, and all of us can only hope that the measures being taken
by those in power are adequate to stabilize and correct these difficult situations.
The $700 billion bailout program that passed in October 2008 is known as the
“Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and it is interesting that the original
bill was only three pages long. With many details added to the program (and a lot of
“pork” by the legislators involved), the program was increased in size to over 1,000

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Opinions and Experiences, Volume 10, 2009

70

pages. The bailout plan calls primarily for the purchase of hundreds of billions of
dollars in illiquid mortgage backed securities (MBS) so there will be more liquidity in
the industry for new loans. Most of these purchases will be at discounted prices. For
example, Merrill Lynch has sold its mortgages to the government at 22 cents on the
dollar (see Floyd 2009). The government will be entitled to any income received on
these mortgages and will also attempt to sell them as opportunities present
themselves.
Financially, the $700 billion legislation will cost the average American about
$2,300 (see Wingfield and Zumbrun, 2008), and the average working American will
have an added burden of about $4,635 (see Kersten, 2008) … But that is just the
beginning of the burden on taxpayers. Since the $700 billion legislation, other
legislative bills have also been passed adding hundreds of billions of dollars to the
burden, and no one really knows how much the catastrophe will cost in the long run.
In the meantime, let us all hope that the efforts put forth will serve to strengthen Main
Street and not just bail out Wall Street.
II. DAVID TUFTE
ECONOMICS PROFESSOR
I have prepared about five hours worth of stuff for my ten minute presentation
here. That has been a problem with this crisis: there are so many details out there that
it is really difficult to encompass all of them. Anyway, I’ve been asked to limit my
discussion to macroeconomics, which is good, because I will have less to say.
What really strike me about this crisis is that no one really cares about the
macroeconomics itself. All that people want to do is use the macroeconomic data they
see as justifications for agendas that they already have. You don’t hear anybody say
this is a cause for less regulation or different regulation. It’s always a call for more
regulation, more centralization of policy, and less reliance on individuals making the
best decisions on the ground. That can’t be a recipe for success.1
So, let’s talk about the macroeconomic situation and how things actually look.
We have bad mouthed the economy for a couple years now and that is really
misplaced (Gallup 2005 reported low numbers for the economy in the middle of the
what turned out to be the nation’s fourth longest expansion). The economy is not
Since the panel discussion, the Obama administration and the 111th Congress have passed the primarily regulatory Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, and the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, the
primarily centralizing Edward M, Kennedy Serve America Act, the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, and the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, while the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (i.e., the stimulus
package) has both regulatory and centralizing aspects, as do the two acts passed by the Bush administration and the 110th
Congress – the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act
of 2008.

1
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doing well but it’s not doing horribly either. On a letter grade scale, we’ve been
pulling solid C’s here (the letter grade system developed by David Tufte at
voluntaryXchange and illustrated at Gongol reported a “C” for the quarter preceding
the panel discussion). We are not failing by any means. That may, and probably will
change, but it’s always good to start with an honest assessment, and that’s been
lacking in the legacy media.2
Last night I got some GDP data and looked at the last five most recent quarters.
This roughly corresponds with the first serious symptoms.3 If you look at the growth
rate that we have actually gotten, the last time we had a situation where real gross
domestic product growth was so weak for 5 straight quarters, without actually going
negative, was July of 1996 (see Bureau of Economic Analysis).
For perspective, it’s useful to think about that date. In July of 1996 we had a
sitting incumbent president that was expected to easily get re-elected. In retrospect, it
isn’t surprising that the Republicans put up against him a guy that stood around in line
long enough to get to the front, with no particularly special qualities. We weren’t
worried too much about the economy then. So, it’s good to ask who benefits from bad
mouthing a similar economy over the last several quarters. This is probably a good
time to remind you that I’m limiting my discussion to the macroeconomics here: my
point is not that the financial problems of the last 5 quarters aren’t large, but rather
that they haven’t translated into macroeconomic problems in a serious way yet.4
Now, I’ll add a couple of other issues that are more about recent economic
events. It’s going to seem kind of odd to think about these things, but
macroeconomists know to look for many small signals in the noisy data rather than
“one big cause” (see Diebold and Rudebusch 1989), so I think it’s worthwhile to bring
these up because they’re going to get suppressed in the non-macroeconomists search
for the “one big cause”. This latest round of trouble started about a month or so after
the Olympic construction got finished.5 Essentially, the biggest expansionary fiscal
policy project in the world just ended (official Chinese numbers are always dubious,
but Rabinovitch 2008 reports spending of no less than $40 billion). If we are going to
think seriously that a fiscal stimulus package coming out of Washington is going to
James Hamilton, author of the most widely accepted and publically available statistical predictor of recessions (see
Econbrowser) produces a recession prediction index that started rising in 2007 IV, but did not enter recession “territory” until
2008 III (both “predictions” were made with a 4 month lag after the end of the quarter.

2

Note that this panel discussion was held before the declaration by the NBER business cycle dating committee that the economy
peaked in December 2007.
4 Recent revisions to real GDP data show declines through 2008, but at the time of the panel discussion, real GDP had only
declined in 2 of the previous 4 quarters, and further those were very modest declines.
5 This is anecdotal, but the speaker knows an architect who worked on the Games’ facilities who can confirm that construction
was not completed on some structures until after the Games had officially begun.
3
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boost the economy, then in order to retain our credibility we need to also acknowledge
that the Chinese just slammed on the brakes of the global economy (note that the
popularized dollar value of the Obama stimulus package is much larger). Experts may
argue about the importance of that to other economies, so it should be emphasized that
Olympic spending is a lot more like textbook fiscal policy than any of the stimulus
proposals that have come out of Washington (see Colander 2007). Around that time
we also had Russia invading Georgia. Russia found this to be a public relations
disaster. As a result, already declining Russian markets went into a complete
nosedive, and actually shut down a couple of times before the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy (Bahkarov 2009 reports that the RTSI index lost over 60% of its value
between its July 4 peak and the time of the panel discussion). This is only part of the
documentable increase in international financial volatility in the weeks preceding the
U.S. financial crisis. Lastly, we have the failure of IndyMac in mid-July. There is
general agreement that IndyMac was in declining health, but that its demise was
hastened by ill-timed news releases on the part of a U.S. Senator. This is symptomatic
of a more general loss of faith in decentralized decision-making by the Washington
policy elite (see Postrel 1999). Reasonable people can argue about the importance or
selectivity of this list, but I think we can agree that there has been a widespread move
by centralized decision-makers towards contractionary policy, destabilizing political
moves, and poorly grounded brinksmanship. Macroeconomics is hard precisely
because past turning points end up being attributed to a preponderance of small
negative shocks rather than a single large one (see Diebold 1999), and my goal here is
to emphasize that we have no shortage of alternative candidates that would lead us to
focus on American financial problems as the sole explanation of macroeconomic
outcomes.6
So this is not just the U.S. If we go out and look at other countries around the
world, the financial problems that they are having in other countries are often worse.
We think about causality as involving the progression of time. Over the next several
months I envision people blaming the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and events that
followed for bad macroeconomic outcomes, but it is useful to keep in mind that it too
was caused by things that preceded it, and these three events stand out.
We also have learned that Iceland is in complete collapse, and the currency
system has started to come apart at the seams; there are actually credible reports of
people selling bags of foreign currency on the internet in Iceland. Hungary is close to
that stage as well. If we look at Ireland, the UK, and Germany—their bailouts are
actually larger in proportional terms than ours are. So, this is a much bigger problem
than just the U.S. but you don’t hear many people talking about that fact. Why are we
6

It is arguable that the early payback of TARP funds by financial institutions in 2009 supports the argument made here in 2008.
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so uptight here if problems are actually bigger in other places? I’m not denying that it
is a big problem here, but maybe we need to be a little less self-centered about this.
So, how are things actually going? Well, I’m not saying this is not a recession
that we are currently in, and I’m not saying that we are not going down a downward
path. We just don’t know the actual scope of things.
I will say we are paying too much attention to things like the stock market. We
pay attention to the stock market, because it’s easy and it’s sitting right on TV in front
of people. The same goes for the policy discussions coming out of Washington. It’s a
lot easier to watch this on TV than to dig through the actual data where the truth lies.
For example, the real action in this crisis is in bond markets and the bond markets are
harder to observe. If we look at those bond markets they were horrific in late
September — they’ve eased up a little bit, but we aren’t talking about the bond
markets enough (see Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002, pg. 107 for a discussion of the
thinness of readily available information on over-the-counter bond markets).
It troubles me when people ask “Is this like the Great Depression?” when the
answer is probably not—probably not at all.7 Could it be that bad, well, yes, anything
could be that bad, but that’s a thought that is almost free of content. There is no way
to tell about that right now, and it certainly doesn’t look that way. It’s got some
suspicious tendencies, I’ll give you that much, but it is nothing like a certainty. This is
an opinion that we don’t see voiced enough in the legacy media right now.
So, let’s think about what we know about macroeconomic turning points and
recessions. What we know about business cycle turning points is that they are almost
unpredictable (see Sichel 1991). We know that the magnitude of recessions is almost
unpredictable. We know that the length of a recession is almost unpredictable (see
Zarnowitz 1992). We can make small improvements over guesses about those three
issues, and that’s it or (see Durland and MacCurdy 1994). You don’t hear enough
people on the news, saying “We can’t tell exactly how bad this is going to be”. All
that you hear people say is “this is horrible, it’s like the Great Depression, we are all
going to lose our houses, our retirement, and all this other stuff, and we are going to
have 25% unemployment”. There is no basis for anybody making those morbid claims
at all. It’s always possible. But what we’ve done is gone from perhaps a one in a
hundred chance to maybe a two in a hundred chance of that happening this year —
which suggests that it’s still not a reasonable thing to be very worried about.

Since the panel discussion a large literature has documented how unlike the Great Depression the “Great Recession” has turned
out not to be; including many people normally associated with emphasizing the severity of the current situation such as Krugman
2009.

7
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Having said that, if we look at the Great Depression, what people want to see is
that the Great Depression – or at least part of it – was a financial panic. So, the next
obvious question is whether this financial panic is like the financial panic we had
then. The answer again is no. In the Great Depression what we had was a couple of
years of real value in the economy being destroyed. After that the banks started
running into liquidity problems that needed to be addressed or else, we were going to
lose financial value too. At that point the Federal Reserve blinked, and we had a huge
loss of financial value (see Friedman and Schwartz 1963). That is not what is going on
in this case at all. This time around the real value is still there. All these houses built
for people who can’t afford them—the houses are still there; the real value is still out
in the economy. But what we have done this time around is lost all this financial
backing first. That makes this financial crisis very much unlike the one that occurred
over the first four years of the Great Depression. That does not mean that a depression
cannot happen this time around, but it does mean that it can’t happen the same way
that it did, and that should be a comfort, albeit a cold one.
The current situation is different than the Great Depression in that, then, there
was a threat that we were going to lose financial value if the Federal Reserve blinked
and didn’t do anything, and it did blink, and the economy did lose that value. Contrast
that with the current situation: we’ve already lost the financial value, and popular
expectations are that we ought to do something about that. Without prejudice against
current policies or plans, it should be clear that there is a non sequitar here: the Great
Depression was a situation of doing A might prevent B happening, while the current
situation is one of B already happened with a hope that doing A after that fact might
undue B. It might work out that way, but I won’t hold my breath.
The bottom line is, we see a lot of people using the macroeconomic situation as
an excuse to propose policies that they had in the back of their mind anyway, except
that now they feel this is a politically expedient time to do it.8 In particular, we see a
lot of calls for using macroeconomic rather than financial outcomes to impose
financial rather than macroeconomic regulations.9 This is in spite of the fact that there
is little objective evidence of relaxation of financial regulations over the last
generation or so on those major corporations that are currently the target of so much
ill will (see Colomiris 2009). We also see a lot of calls for using the data collected –
by centralized decision-making institutions to describe what the decentralized
decision-makers are doing – to justify shifting decentralized decision-making
authority to those same centralized institutions. In both of these, my verbiage is
Since the panel discussion, many have become familiar with the quote from Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s Chief of Staff:
“You never let a serious crisis go to waste. And what I mean by that it’s [sic] and opportunity to do things you think you could
not do before.”
9 Barney Frank, chair of the House Financial Services Committee: “It is because the fight against the harshest aspects of
unrestricted capitalism is therefore a political problem and not an intellectual one that community action remains so essential.”
8
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necessary to highlight the intellectual sleight-of-hand on display from politicians and
pundits.
III. ROBB KERRY
BANKER
There have been a lot of people saying that banks don’t have any money to
lend. I want to first tell you it’s not entirely true for every bank out there. We have
money to lend; feel free to drop by. However, there is a phenomenon occurring
throughout most of the financial sector right now, and many banks do not have money
to lend. I would like to take just a minute and talk about why that’s the case when
there have only been a select few banks that have actually failed.
We’ve talked about Lehman Brothers. Merrill Lynch has had its share of
problems. Washington Mutual and a handful of others have appeared to have
catastrophic collapses. So the question is, how does this affect every other bank
throughout the economy, and does this affect banks in our local area?
Let’s talk for a second about how banks operate. Banks get funding to loan
money primarily from two sources: they have capital, which is the money that owners
put in, typically by buying bank stock; and they take deposits. Let’s take a sample
bank and say their owners invest capital of $10 million. Then they take in deposits,
which are the primary source of funding for community banks. Let’s say the sample
bank takes in $90 million in deposits. Now the bank has a 10:1 financial leverage
ratio, meaning that for every dollar of assets the owners have invested $0.10 of
capital. This leveraged balance sheet is a potentially profitable scenario, because the
bank pays a lower rate to its depositors than it charges its borrowers. The bank may
pay a CD rate of 3.50% to 4.00%, but it may lend those funds to its borrowers and
collect an interest rate from 7.00% to 9.50% or higher, depending on the type of loan.
Some people look at this scenario and say that it’s unjust, because the bank is
making a spread using funds that are not theirs. Yet when you consider the financial
risk of this scenario, particularly with the 10:1 financial leverage ratio in the balance
sheet, you can see that this scenario may not be so unjust. In fact, the financial risk of
this scenario is why a lot of banks don’t have money to lend at the moment.
Going back to our sample bank, the $90 million that was effectively borrowed
from the public by accepting deposits was loaned out at a 10:1 financial leverage
ratio. However, any losses realized on those loans come directly out of capital dollar
for dollar. The depositors who provided the funding do not share in the risk or the
losses. So, putting some numbers into this scenario, because the sample bank funded
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$100 million in assets with $90 million of deposits and $10 million of capital, if the
bank experiences $5 millions of loss in its loan portfolio, that loss represents only 5%
of its assets, but 50% of its capital is now gone. This puts the bank’s capital below
regulatory minimum capital levels, which causes regulators to come in and demand
immediate corrective action designed to restore appropriate capitalization. At this
point, the bank will have three main options: they can raise capital internally or
through public offerings; they can sell the bank to someone with adequate funds to
recapitalize it; or they can sell their loans to reduce the overall size of the bank.
In our current economy, with most investors worried about banks and the
financial sector in general, there won’t be too many people standing in line begging to
buy the stock of a troubled bank that’s being forced to raise capital, so that option is
unlikely to be successful.
The second option, selling the bank, is also undesirable because a troubled bank
with inadequate capital would sell at a tremendous discount. There will be
shareholders who have invested much of their wealth and their livelihoods into
growing the bank who will oppose the sale. There are also community factors to
consider. If a large national bank buys a small, troubled community bank and folds it
into its large-bank business model, will the residents and businesses of the community
receive fair representation when they approach the new bank to establish deposit
accounts or apply for credit? Again, the community factors will pose a tremendous
barrier to the owners selling the bank.
Finally, the bank can get rid of some of their loans, thereby reducing asset size
and overall risk exposure, and return to a more appropriate capital ratio. In this option,
because of that 10:1 financial leverage ratio, the bank would have to sell off much
more than $5 million in loans to offset the $5 millions of lost capital. In fact, the bank
probably would have to sell at least $30 million in loans.
This is the situation that many banks find themselves in right now, and it’s the
source of their inability and/or unwillingness to lend. They have not experienced the
catastrophic failures that are covered on CNN and Bloomberg, but they have
experienced portfolio losses and write-downs that have forced them to take action and
strengthen their balance sheets. They are unable to write many new loans, and they
may even be trying to unload a portion of their old loans at the same time.
I hear a lot of talk about liquidity, and I’ll move on to that subject for a
moment. Liquidity in the banking world really means two things: it means having
access to funding and the ability to convert that funding into loans. At the moment,
there’s little funding available because the bond market has taken a terrible beating,
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which somehow has not gotten the same amount of attention as the Dow Jones’ price
swings. A large amount of our nation’s lending is funded indirectly through the
issuance of bonds, which are backed by the various loan products they fund, and the
vast majority of industrial investors simply are not interested in buying these types of
bonds.
Over the past decade the mortgage industry received amazing influxes of liquidity by
issuing mortgage-backed securities, which were considered safe and highly desirable
instruments for many industrial investors. Now that the value of these bonds and their
underlying collateral has come into question, most decision makers are no longer
interested in investing in them. As a result, it’s become much harder for a large lender
to package loans and issue bonds. This type of activity is possible, but the market has
drastically changed its tolerance for certain loan products as collateral for these bond
issuances. Consequently, most of the loans that large, troubled lenders would like to
unload are no longer acceptable for securitization activities. That creates the illiquidity
we’ve heard so much about—lenders are unable to generate funding for new loan
underwriting, and they are unable to generate liquidity using their existing loan
portfolios.
This illiquidity has put a tremendous squeeze on most lenders, large and small.
A lot of banks are in such a predicament that if you inquire about a loan, they really
will not seem too interested. This is the exact opposite of what borrowers have come
to expect over the past decade, and quite a few of them are shocked to discover how
much lenders’ attitudes have changed. In reality, it’s not that the bank doesn’t like
you. It’s not that they think ill of your community. They simply are not in a position
to generate new loan volume.
I think under the circumstances of our economy and financial sector, we’ll
probably see quite a few consolidations over the next year or two as banks continue to
recognize and realize losses and write-downs. With illiquid portfolios and few options
for raising capital, it’s likely that some of the impaired financial institutions out there
will be acquired by larger entities with more ready access to capital and more liquid
balance sheets.10
This brings us to the critical question for this group, how does all of this affect
us locally? I’m a community banker. That is what I’ve been for most of my career,
besides being a bank regulator. I’ve never worked for a large bank, and I’ve stayed in
fairly small communities. From my perspective, I think the most affected group right
now will be small businesses. Small business loans in general have typically been
Since the panel discussion, there has been a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the investment banking and brokerage
industries.

10
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perceived as somewhat speculative. A small business owner may request a loan to
start a new business, expand an existing business, or just get working capital so he can
meet his payroll. For example, it may be a plumber who goes out and does a job at
somebody’s home, and he typically doesn’t get paid for a while until after the job is
completed. If he does a job under a general contractor who’s building a spec home, it
might take quite a while before he gets paid. In the meantime, the people who worked
with him on the job, the suppliers, and the gas station that puts fuel in his truck, they
all expect to be paid today. Businesses borrow money for working capital that is
supposed to bridge those differences in cash flow. These businesspeople come in for a
loan and they’re typically not in a position to offer a lot of collateral, and it’s usually a
difficult loan to get approved—right now it’s even more difficult. Banks that have
reduced capacity to lend are going to find it very hard to supply credit to small
businesspeople. That is damaging to an economy—it’s definitely something we don’t
want to be pervasive.
How do our economy and financial struggles affect consumers? It really
depends on whether you’re looking to deposit or borrower, what you are trying to buy
with your borrowings, and whether you’ve got the ability to make a reasonable down
payment.
If you’re a depositor, the news is fairly positive. Deposit rates are quite
attractive right now, especially when compared to recent performance of our equity
markets or compared to yields on other “risk free” investments, such as Treasury
instruments.
If you’re a potential borrower, those attractive deposit rates are working against
you at the moment, especially when compared to some of the traditional indexes (such
as Prime), which have become out of touch with actual borrowing rates. Borrowing
costs are still fairly reasonable for the most creditworthy borrowers, but rates have
become somewhat unattractive for the more “average” borrowers, especially
commercial borrowers, and prohibitively high or even unavailable for high risk or
subprime borrowers.
Tying these realities to our everyday lives, if you want buy a home but you
don’t have any money to put down, your income is not very stable or hard to
document, and your credit score is not so good because you’ve overextended yourself
or had some trouble with payments in the past, I’m sorry to say it might be very
difficult for you to finance a home right now. Conversely, if you are in a position to
bring 20 percent cash into the transaction for the down payment, if you’ve kept your
credit record in good condition, and if you’ve got stable income and reasonable
capacity to repay—meaning that you don’t have an excessively high debt-to-income
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ratio—I don’t think you will be too affected by this credit crisis. That type of funding
is still available; there are still government programs to promote this type of lending.
The same scenario applies to other types of consumer credit, such as buying a
car. If you are looking to buy a vehicle, you might have a challenge getting that done
through Ford Motor Credit or GMAC, both of which rely heavily on bond funding.
But your local community bank is probably in a pretty good position to help you with
a request like that. If you’ve got a credit score that compliments you and you’ve put
some money down on the automobile, you should be able to find reasonable
financing.
As a consumer and possibly as an investor, there’s even a little bit of an upside
to our current economic situation, depending on the position you are in. Right now,
many people are panicking, which is not necessarily the wise thing to do. We’ve seen
some fire-sale prices recently. People who have liquidity right now, investors who can
step up with cash in hand and consummate a transaction without relying on outside
financing— these are the people who can really benefit from our economic
challenges.
Equity prices have plummeted. P/E ratios are at historic lows. Housing prices
are way down. If you’re looking to refinance your home or sell your home, that’s bad
news. However, if you’re moving to the area to buy a home, you might pay less now
for a decent house than you would have even three or four years ago. And again, if
you have some money for a down payment, a decent credit score, and reasonable
income that you can document, it’s very likely you can find attractive financing to
help you buy that bargain house. From that perspective, the future doesn’t look quite
so bleak.
In conclusion, our financial sector deals in risk, and it does so with a highly
leveraged balance sheet. Recent and ongoing losses and write-downs have rapidly
eroded the capital bases required of lenders, forcing them to seek new capital and
possibly consolidate, but more notably it has reduced their ability to lend. Illiquidity
in their loan portfolios and in bond markets has further reduced their ability to lend.
This has the potential to stunt the growth of small businesses and even impair their
ability to satisfy current liabilities and fulfill contracts, which is an immediate and
substantial concern for our entire economy. On a consumer level, lending also has
been restricted, but reasonable financing options remain available for borrowers with
adequate down payments, decent credit records, and reasonable documented incomes.
On the upside, for those consumers and investors with liquidity, there are many
equities and assets available at very attractive prices. Accordingly, despite the
challenges we face, the future is not a complete loss. There are some positives.
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At the end of the day, the United States still has a good work ethic, a productive
workforce, and a $13 trillion annual GDP. I believe that now is a time to tighten our
belts a bit, adapt to our current financial environment where possible, work to
improve that financial environment where adaptation is not a viable option, and look
forward to the future with prudent and cautious optimism.
IV. STEVE HARROP
RETIRED FUND MANAGER AND PROFESSIONAL-IN-RESIDENCE
I want to go back to a couple of points made by Steve Evans. Most of you
know about the television commercials of a few years ago teaching us how to become
real estate tycoon, right? This is how you do it, we’ve got a book, buy the book, do
this and you are going to be very, very wealthy—very, very quickly. And you’ve seen
the graphs of home prices that for a decade were fairly steep, going up. It attracted,
not just the individual of modest means who is anxious to get into his home before
prices rose, but also speculators of considerable means—individuals with a lot of
money, with deep pockets that decided they would build spec homes: sometimes 5,
sometimes 10 spec homes. And of course, when prices began to fall — those
individuals were the first to try and sell: let’s get out of this hole now because we
can’t afford to carry 5 or 10 homes. Even so. spec homes have and are still dragging
very wealthy people down. It’s not just the individual of modest means who is
defaulting on his mortgage. It’s everybody who has speculated or who has falsified a
mortgage loan application or who has tried to get in on the government
encouragement to try to participate in a market that was only going to go up. That was
domino #1.
Domino #2 is the fact that mortgage market /real estate market is supported by
debt. Almost every real estate transaction has a mortgage, and unlike much of what
we do in the economy — most of it is done by debt. Mortgage debt has traditionally
been a very sound investment. Institutions who are conservative would buy mortgages
— historically with default rates of less than one-half of one percent –insurance
companies, brokerage firms, banks, and it has been a good investment. Let’s not fault
these individuals for buying something that for decades has been sound. But what we
found is that the mortgage wasn’t the same as it used to be. That mortgage was held
by the speculator who had 10 homes he was trying to carry. That mortgage was held
by a person of modest means who couldn’t afford it. That mortgage was a virus and
that virus began to infiltrate the entire financial system. Everybody who touched a
mortgage; banks, insurance companies, savings & loans, brokerage firms, domestic
and foreign – everybody was hurt, because the mortgages began to default—Domino
#2.
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Do you see a pattern here? The pattern is debt. Now we come to the third
domino — the consumer – who for decades has mined the equity out of their home
with home improvement and second loans. Those who, for example, saw that the
value of their home was up $30,000, and borrowed that to buy a boat or RV. At this
point in time that value is not only gone, but he owes more on his home than it’s
worth. We are down 20- 30%--the home markets are down much further than that. So,
the consumer for decades has mined the equity out of his house, finds that source of
wealth gone, and he is scrambling to make payments. Now consider his position. He
has lost his equity, his down payment of 20% gone, up in smoke—it isn’t there
anymore. At the same time, he’s looking at the stock market that is down
considerably. Do you know what the high point of the Dow was – 14,163 a year ago.
We’ve had this hit occur in 12 months. So, he doesn’t have his home to go to, he’s
looking over his shoulder at his pension, as Joe Baker just pointed out, and he’s
wondering, “You know, I’m a poor person. I don’t have any money anymore. I’ve got
too much debt, and my assets have shriveled up and gone away. What do I do?” Stop
spending—domino #3
As the consumer stops spending, all of those individuals that are dependent on
the consumer are going to be hurt. You’ve seen the story in autos, some of you have
seen the retail sales reports — it will get worse. We are at the point now where
multiple dominos are falling as this debt infiltrates the economy and begins hurting
not just the consumer, but the institutions that rely on the consumer.
What we can say about the government actions as hurried as they are, is that
sometimes you throw everything against the wall and see what sticks. I was having a
conversation with a member of Congress the other day; he gave a little insight into
that program. He said to me that when Secretary of the Treasury Paulson and Federal
Reserve Chairman Bernanke sat down with the leadership of the House, they told
them they had 5 days to do something. Five days to do something before the economy
would fail. So, Congress is running scared. They didn’t know quite what to do. So, we
have everything thrown against the wall to see what will stick. We have 3-page
proposals to spend $700,000,000,000 and it has been pointed out that it’s just growing
since then, as we try and get a handle on the debt, this virus, this toxic waste, that has
infiltrated the economy. Are we going to be successful—YES. The Federal Reserve
will win. They always do. It’s just a matter of time, but while we wait for those
programs to get traction, the consumer has stopped spending, small business is
struggling, and large business is going down: big institutions laying off thousands; the
unemployment rate will go up. But once these programs begin relieving the economy
of this bad debt, once institutions feel free to lend again, once the consumer begins to
get confidence that maybe we are at the bottom of real estate prices, maybe we don’t
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have another 20% down to go. Then things will start to rebound. Bottom line—we’ll
probably have another year or so of weak economic and financial numbers. At that
point we are going to be bumping along the bottom. Will the stock market go down
some more – maybe. But, remember the stock market is a leading indicator. It
anticipates that unemployment is going to go higher, it has already accounted for that.
And we will continue to be volatile as some of these numbers delay getting traction,
but as they get traction, the recession we are experiencing now will be shallower and
shorter than the recession would have been without these programs.
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